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ABSTRACT 
Collaboration and acquisition have traditionally been observed as two alternative 
strategies to get access to external technologies. However, real option scholars have 
recently argued that firms can also engage in transitional technology sourcing 
trajectories where collaboration and acquisition are used as complementary strategies. 
While these real option scholars have identified factors that influence when partners 
are likely to shift from collaboration to acquisition, they remain silent on how such a 
transition can be effectively managed. Based on a multiple case-study of four 
transitional technology sourcing trajectories between one entrepreneurial and one 
established firm, this study therefore explores how the pre-acquisition collaboration 
stage and the post-acquisition integration are related to each other. Our findings 
suggest that entrepreneurial companies may use the pre-acquisition collaboration 
stage as a period to evaluate the goodwill of the established partner. In addition, we 
point to the presence of pre-acquisition integration efforts and the extent of strategic 
convergence during the pre-acquisition collaboration stage as factors that substantially 
influence the success of the post-acquisition integration process in transitional 
governance trajectories. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades, we have witnessed a shift from a closed innovation model, 
where established companies focused on internal development of new technologies, to 
an open innovation model, where established companies increasingly relied on 
interactions with entrepreneurial companies to get access to new technologies 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Hagedoorn, 2002). In line with this evolution, scholars (e.g. 
Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Pisano, 1990; Williamson, 1991) have sought to 
understand whether established firms should source technologies through 
collaborations or integrate technologies through acquisitions. While this external 
technology sourcing literature initially framed collaborations and acquisitions as two 
alternative strategies, it is increasingly realized that these two external technology 
sourcing strategies are complementary. In particular, real option scholars (e.g. Folta, 
1998; Folta & Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991; McGrath, 1997) show that acquisitions of 
firms are frequently preceded by more collaborative approaches. Moreover, these 
studies provide evidence that factors such as uncertainty of the target technology and 
valuation of the target company determine the timing of a shift from a collaborative to 
an integrative approach.  
While existing studies on external technology sourcing provide valuable 
insights in when companies are likely to shift from collaboration to acquisition, they 
remain relatively silent on how this transition is actually managed. The existing 
literature on technology acquisitions – i.e. acquisitions of small technology-based 
firms by large, established firms (Puranam, 2001) - however, emphasizes that 
successfully acquiring entrepreneurial firms is not a straightforward task. In 
particular, they argue that the management of technology acquisitions triggers a 
fundamental organizational dilemma (Birkinshaw, Bresnman & Hakanson, 2000; 
Grimpe, 2007; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006; Ranft & Lord, 2002). While 
preservation of the acquired firm’s main technological capabilities asks for substantial 
autonomy of the acquired firm, the synergistic exploitation of these technological 
capabilities demands substantial integration of the acquired firm (Ranft & Lord, 
2002). According to these acquisition scholars, the most feasible option to deal with 
this dilemma is to apply a gradual post-acquisition integration trajectory, where the 
acquired firm initially maintains substantial autonomy and becomes more integrated 
later on (Bannert & Tschirky, 2004; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991). However, it needs to be stressed these existing studies on the post-acquisition 
integration process apply a quite atomistic perspective on acquisitions, neglecting the 
possibility that acquired firm and acquiring firm share a history of prior collaboration. 
Actually, these studies seem to implicitly assume that the involved firms did not 
collaborate before the acquisition. A systematic analysis of how pre-acquisition 
collaboration and post-acquisition integration are related therefore seems to be 
necessary. 
 The purpose of this research is to build theory on how the pre-acquisition 
collaboration process influences the post-acquisition integration process. In order to 
do so, we conducted a multiple-case study of 4 technology sourcing trajectories 
between one entrepreneurial and one established company in which a shift from a 
collaborative to an integrative approach was realized. For each case, we conducted 
interviews with managers and engineers of both involved companies and executed a 
systematic archival analysis of public as well as private documents. 
 From a theoretical perspective, our findings contribute to a richer 
understanding of transitional governance in external technology sourcing trajectories. 
While real option scholars stress that established firms can rely on pre-acquisition 
collaboration in technological sourcing trajectories to assess the feasibility of the 
technological competencies of the entrepreneurial firm, we argue that entrepreneurial 
firms can apply this collaborative stage in the technology sourcing trajectory to 
evaluate the goodwill of the established partner. In addition, we point to the presence 
of pre-acquisition integration efforts and the extent of strategic convergence during 
the pre-acquisition collaboration stage as factors that can substantially influence the 
success of the post-acquisition integration process in transitional governance 
trajectories. From a managerial perspective, our findings suggest an alternative 
acquisition integration trajectory that allows addressing the dilemma between 
preserving value and realizing operational synergies in technology acquisitions.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how pre-acquisition collaboration influences 
post-acquisition integration. Although case studies have remained rather rare within 
the technology sourcing literature, this design is appropriate for our study because it 
allows us to 1) answer ‘how’ questions about a contemporary set of events over which 
the investigator has little or no control (Yin, 1984), 2) mobilize multiple observations 
on complex relational processes such as collaboration and integration (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Parkhe, 1993), and 3) draw in the significance of 
various interconnected levels of analysis such as the operational and managerial level 
(Faems, Janssens, Madhok & Van Looy, In Press; Hall, 2006; Pettigrew, 1990). 
As we wanted to inductively build theory on the shift from collaboration to 
acquisition in external technology sourcing trajectories, our objective was to study a 
small number of external technology sourcing trajectories in great detail (Birkinshaw 
et al., 2000). We limited our study to high-tech settings (i.e. advanced material 
industry) to minimize extraneous variation (Eisenhardt, 1989) that might be derived 
from differences between technology intensive settings and settings where technology 
is less dominant. In the end, we managed to get access to 4 external technology 
sourcing trajectories, situated in the Advanced Materials industry. Table I summarizes 
the major characteristics of the selected cases. The names of companies, products, and 
individuals are disguised to ensure confidentiality.  
----- Insert Table I about here ----- 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data on the four external technology sourcing trajectories were collected in a 
retrospective way, allowing for a much more focused data gathering process 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990; Poole et al., 2002). At the same time, unconsciously 
accepting respondent bias might occur in retrospective studies, leading to confusion 
about cause and effect relationships (Leonard-Barton, 1990). We therefore 
triangulated our data, applying multiple data collection techniques, including 
interviews and archival review of documents (see Table II). Applying the suggestions 
of Pettigrew (1990) and Pentland (1999), we made an explicit distinction between 
three different stages in our theory building process, representing an evolution of 
surface levels to deeper levels of data collection and analysis.  
For each external technology sourcing trajectory, we first conducted 
unstructured interviews with two key informants (i.e. senior managers) and studied 
relevant documents (i.e. contracts, reports of managerial and operational meetings, 
and publicly available data). Based on this information we constructed a graphical 
representation of the chronology of the major events that had taken place within each 
trajectory.  
In the second stage, we conducted semi-structured interviews (Kvale, 1996) 
for each case with both managers and engineers of the involved organizations. We 
interviewed in total 32 persons (see Table II). Interviews were conducted individually, 
face-to-face, and in the native language of the interviewee to maximize the 
informant’s ability to express its thoughts, feelings, and opinions. The interviews were 
structured along the chronology of the major events, asking the respondents to 
describe these events and the kind of interactions these events triggered between the 
partners. The average length of the interviews was between one and two hours. The 
transcribed interviews were sent back to the interviewees to give them the opportunity 
to hand over additional comments. At this stage, we also reexamined the available 
documents to verify whether the content of the interviews was consistent with the 
content of the documents. When discrepancies between these two data sources were 
observed, we again contacted respondents to ask for additional comments. After semi-
structured interviews were completed, a case study report was written for each 
external technology sourcing trajectory. In these reports, we made extensive use of 
citations from interviews as well as documents, achieving a high level of accuracy 
(Langley, 1999). We discussed these case study reports with managers of the involved 
firms in order to assure that they provided a realistic representation of the history of 
the alliance. These discussions provided additional data, which allowed us to fine-
tune the case study reports. 
----- Insert Table II about here ----- 
The purpose of the third stage was to interpret the narrative, developed in the 
previous stage in order to answer our research questions. In this stage, we used an 
inductive approach, relying on an iterative process that coupled within-case analysis 
with between-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984). We started with 
conducting a within-case analysis for each observed trajectory. We re-assessed each 
case, focusing on the shift from collaboration to acquisition. In specific, we searched 
for linkages between the process of collaboration during the pre-acquisition stage and 
the process of integration during the post-acquisition stage. After the completion of 
these within-case analyses, we compared the findings across the three cases. Based on 
the identification of similarities and differences across cases, new iterations of within-
case and across-case analysis were subsequently initiated. This procedure was 
repeated until dominant findings emerged.  
 
RESULTS 
Pre-Acquisition Collaboration 
 Pre-acquisition collaboration to evaluate goodwill of the established partner. 
Real option scholars (e.g. Folta & Leiblein, 1994; Folta & Miller, 2002) argued that, 
in external technology trajectories, established partners can rely on pre-acquisition 
collaboration to evaluate the value of the entrepreneurial partner’s technology without 
having the obligation to make irreversible commitments. Two of our cases (i.e. 
Combustion Burner Trajectory and Substrate Polishing Trajectory) were in line with 
this real option argument. In these cases a collaborative strategy was seen as the ideal 
option to get acquainted with the technology of the entrepreneurial partner without 
having to make substantial investments. The following statement of one MAT 
manager regarding MAT’s decision to buy an equity stake of 51% in GBURN is an 
illustrative example in this respect: 
‘GBURN’s burner technology perfectly fitted in our strategy of forward 
integration… [However], our board was not ready to radically invest in this 
technology as it was not really linked to our core activities… [Therefore], we 
decided to first buy 51% and also negotiate an option to move to 100% later 
on.’ (MAT manager) 
 
In the two other cases (i.e. Coating Trajectory and Optical Glass Trajectory), 
however, we observed that the established partner actually wanted to immediately 
acquire the entrepreneurial partner as the technology of the entrepreneurial partner 
was of high strategic importance for the established company. In these cases, it was 
the entrepreneurial partner that insisted on engaging in a pre-acquisition collaboration 
stage in order to evaluate the good intentions of the established partner. In particular, 
the entrepreneurial partner wanted to use pre-acquisition collaboration as a stage to 
find out whether the established partner was really committed to further apply and 
develop their technology. The Coating Trajectory is an illustrative example in this 
respect. After scanning the coating industry, MAT identified FRCOAT as a company 
that possessed an Advanced DLC technology. MAT was very interested in this 
technology as it could help MAT in improving its existing DLC/DLX technology. 
MAT therefore wanted to acquire FRCOAT in order to get access to this technology. 
Although the CEO of FRCOAT was interested in closer collaboration with MAT as 
this could trigger important technological, commercial and operational synergies, he 
did not want to immediately sell his company to MAT. In November 2001, MAT and 
FRCOAT therefore signed a collaborative agreement, allowing MAT to buy 49% of 
FRCOAT’s shares. This agreement was called a ‘marriage d’essai’ (i.e. an attempt to 
marry) and stipulated that FRCOAT had the right to stop the collaboration after two 
years and buy back MAT’s shares. The CEO of FRCOAT explicitly stressed that the 
intention of this collaborative agreement was to test the reliability of MAT:    
‘I wanted to collaborate but I also wanted to have the opportunity to end the 
collaboration in two years when I would feel that the collaboration did not 
work out. The purpose of the marriage d’essai was not to limit the 
collaboration. I believed that this agreement would force each party to conduct 
the necessary efforts to get to know the other partner and to really think about 
the different opportunities to work together. (FRCOAT manager)’ 
 
In sum, while real option scholars emphasize that established partners can use 
pre-acquisition collaboration to assess the technological competencies of the 
entrepreneurial partner, our data indicate that entrepreneurial partners can rely on pre-
acquisition collaboration to evaluate the good intentions of the established partner.  
Pre-Acquisition integration efforts. Acquisition scholars refer to integration 
efforts as ‘the making of changes in the functional activity arrangements, 
organizational structures and systems, and cultures of combining organizations to 
facilitate their consolidation into a functioning whole’ (Pablo, 1994: 806). While the 
existing acquisition literature has focused on integration efforts during the post-
acquisition stage, we observed that, in our cases, integration efforts were already 
initiated during the pre-acquisition stage (see Table III). 
In the Coating Trajectory, for instance, partners initiated pre-acquisition 
integration efforts to consolidate their technology platforms. As already mentioned, 
MAT wanted to apply FRCOAT’s Advanced DLC technology in order to improve its 
existing DLC/DLX technology. However, interviewees emphasized that, during the 
first six months of their collaboration, transfer of knowledge between engineers of 
MAT and FRCOAT advanced with difficulty. Although engineers of both partners 
were motivated to exchange knowledge, interviewees indicated that they were not 
able to arrive at a common understanding of their respective technologies. After six 
months, managers of both companies therefore decided to conduct efforts in order to 
create a joint technology platform. In particular, it was decided to install each other’s 
coating systems: a FRCOAT coating system was installed at MAT, while a MAT 
coating system was installed at FRCOAT. In addition, joint training sessions for MAT 
and FRCOAT engineers were organized to support this exchange of technology 
equipment. As one FRCOAT engineer expressed, it was the installation of each 
other’s technological equipment that allowed getting a fine-grained understanding of 
the partner’s technology: 
‘It is a very interesting step because you first think that the partner’s 
technology is very good. However, by using the machines you start 
experiencing problems. In a similar vein, MAT people experience problems 
with using our FRCOAT coaters. In this way, it becomes possible to list the 
strong and weak characteristics of both coating systems. For me this was the 
fundamental step in the collaboration which really meant that both parties 
started working with each others technology (FRCOAT engineer)’  
 
In the Combustion Burner Trajectory and the Substrate Polishing Trajectory, 
similar kinds of integration efforts were conducted to consolidate partners’ technology 
platforms. During the pre-acquisition collaboration stage of the Burner Combustion 
Trajectory, one GBURN engineer regularly visited the MAT facilities in order to 
come to a common platform for media that could be used for combustion burner 
applications. In the Substrate Polishing Trajectory, one GCOMP engineer visited 
POLIISH to learn about the entrepreneurial partner’s capabilities in polishing silicon 
substrates. Next, this transferred knowledge was applied within GCOMP to develop 
capabilities for polishing anonium substrates. These anonium substrate polishing 
capabilities were subsequently transferred back to POLISH. In this way, a common 
technology platform emerged that allowed GCOMP and POLISH to conduct similar 
anonium substrate polishing activities for the same customer. 
We did not only identify pre-acquisition efforts to come to a consolidated 
technology platform, but we also observed that, during the collaborative stage of the 
Optical Glass Trajectory and the Substrate Polishing Trajectory, partners made efforts 
in consolidating their operational production system. In the Optical Glass Trajectory, 
for instance, GCOMP and OPTICS had agreed at the start of their collaboration to 
jointly industrialize OPTICS’ Optical Glass technology for commercial applications 
in the automotive industry. In order to do so, the OPTICS team, consisting of three 
people (i.e. CEO and two engineers), had to start developing industrial prototypes of 
the optical glass technology, while the GCOMP was responsible for the worldwide 
promotion of OPTICS’ optical glass technology. However, during the first year of 
their collaboration, it quickly became clear that the OPTICS team, which had been 
very experienced in conducting explorative activities such as fundamental research 
and conducting laboratory experiments, did not really have the motivation and ability 
to conduct exploitative activities (i.e. standardization, upscaling, and fine-tuning), 
which were necessary to industrialize the Optical Glass technology:  
‘The people at OPTICS really were still R&D people… They were not used to 
do process engineering. Their reasoning was: ‘let’s try something; if it works 
we have a process.’ (GCOMP engineer)’ 
‘GCOMP wanted to commercialize as quickly as possible… [However], we 
were specialists. We first wanted to achieve perfect quality before initiating 
production. (OPTICS engineer)’  
 
Moreover, the existing facilities of OPTICS did not really allow for high-
quality production, which clearly hampered the ability to move to large-scale 
industrialization of the technology: 
‘They were not used to do production. They were working in a laboratory… 
You had to put things into the oven; then you had to wait for a while; next you 
had to open the oven, remove a lid and again put it into the oven. This was not 
a process. This would not be possible on an industrial scale.’ (GCOMP 
engineer)’ 
 
While OPTICS was struggling in developing industrial prototypes, GCOMP 
made progress in marketing the optical glass technology on an international scale. 
One year after the start of their collaborative endeavor, GCOMP had succeeded in 
attracting the interest of several potential customers. However, as OPTICS had 
achieved little progress in exploiting its technology for large-scale applications, it was 
impossible to hand over industrial prototypes of optical lenses to these potential 
customers. GCOMP therefore decided that interventions at OPTICS were necessary in 
order to adjust their production system. GCOMP therefore decided to send, on a 
regular basis, one process engineer to OPTICS for several days in order to find out 
which operational problems were encountered at OPTICS and how GCOMP could 
contribute to solve these problems. During his visits this process engineer tried to 
make interventions that ‘could make the life of the OPTICS engineers easier’ 
(GCOMP engineer). For instance, he arranged that OPTICS engineers got free access 
to equipment of GCOMP, which could be used for improving OPTICS’ existing 
production process. In addition, he invited engineers of OPTICS to GCOMP to show 
them how GCOMP addressed some of the operational problems that OPTICS was 
facing. Gradually, this process engineer became a liaison person who helped OPTICS 
engineers contacting other GCOMP engineers for the solution of specific operational 
problems that OPTICS engineers faced in adjusting their production system. In 
addition to this human support, GCOMP also stimulated OPTICS to move to a new 
production facility. As OPTICS had limited financial resources, GCOMP provided 
financial support to build a new facility that would allow high-quality production of 
Optical Glass products. The human and financial support of GCOMP in adjusting the 
operational production system of OPTICS quickly started to pay off. In 2000, first 
industrial prototypes of optical glass lenses for large-scale optical applications were 
delivered to interested customers. 
In the Substrate Polishing Trajectory, similar kinds of integration efforts were 
conducted to consolidate the production systems. Also in this case, the established 
partner (i.e. GCOMP) sent on a regular basis one engineer to the facilities of the 
entrepreneurial partner (i.e. POLISH) to adjust the existing production system and 
provided the necessary financial support, allowing the entrepreneurial partner to move 
to a new facility. 
In sum, our cases provide evidence that, during the pre-acquisition 
collaboration stage of external technology sourcing trajectories, partners can already 
initiate integration efforts to consolidate 1) the technological platform of both partners 
and/or 2) the operational production systems of both partners. Regarding these pre-
acquisition integration efforts, we have to make two important additional remarks. 
First, we observed that, in most of the cases, it was the established company that took 
the initiative to initiate pre-acquisition integration efforts. At the same time, the 
established partner introduced these integration efforts in a very careful manner. 
Instead of imposing changes on the entrepreneurial partner, the integration efforts 
were launched as suggestions towards the entrepreneurial partner and they were 
introduced in a very gradual manner. The initiation of the pre-acquisition efforts in the 
Optical Glass trajectory is an illustrative example in this respect. As already 
mentioned, GCOMP decided to send on a regular basis a project engineer to OPTICS 
in order to improve their operational production system. Both GCOMP and OPTICS 
interviewees emphasized that this kind of operational support was carefully 
introduced at OPTICS. According to the GCOMP interviewees, this careful approach 
was necessary in order to avoid feelings of disruption at the entrepreneurial partner:   
‘You can not enter there and say: ‘guys, from now on we do it our way’. I was 
of the opinion that I could not do that. They would no longer be behind the 
steering wheel and would lose direction. This needs to go step by step. In this 
way, you can build a good understanding… In this small entity, it did not 
make sense to implement heavy project management programs that explicitly 
stipulated what should be done. In this case they would look as if one has been 
poleaxed and they would fear that they had to spend half of their precious time 
on administration. (GCOMP engineer)’ 
 
At the same time, one GCOMP manager acknowledged that, as GCOMP only 
was a minority shareholder in OPTICS, they did not have the power position to 
impose changes on this entrepreneurial company:  
‘At the beginning we could not do much more than providing advice. During 
board meetings, I said what I thought about it, but they [OPTICS] were free to 
do with this information what they wanted. Because we only possessed 40% of 
the shares, we did not have any decisive power. (GCOMP project manager)’ 
 
A second important additional observation was that, in our cases, the pre-
acquisition integration efforts seemed to contribute to the emergence of a solid 
relational foundation between the engineers of the involved companies. In the Coating 
Trajectory, for instance, interviewees referred to the exchange of the coating 
equipment and the joint training sessions as events that triggered positive relational 
dynamics on the operational level: 
‘In the beginning, people on the operational level have to get used to each 
other. After we had visited FRCOAT to learn about their technology and 
FRCOAT engineers had visited MAT to learn about our technology, the ice 
was broken though. People started to see each other as comrades.  
Consequently, when we experienced a problem with their coating system, they 
were always willing to give us assistance. (MAT engineer)’ 
 
In a similar vein, interviewees stressed that the pre-acquisition integration 
efforts in the Optical Glass Trajectory contributed to the emergence of a more trustful 
relationship:  
‘When you introduce such a project manager and you support the building of a 
new facility, you create a platform of trust on which you can continue to build 
the relationship.’ (GCOMP manager) 
 
 
Post-Acquisition Integration 
 Initiation of post-acquisition integration process. Real option scholars (e.g. 
Folta & Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991) argue that, when the future value of the 
technology becomes less uncertain, partners are likely to shift from a collaborative to 
a more integrative governance approach. Our data affirm this reasoning. In the Optical 
Glass Trajectory, for instance, a shift from collaboration to acquisition was made after 
it had become clear that some customers were interested in buying substantial 
amounts of the Optical Glass product. In particular, the CEO of the entrepreneurial 
company (i.e. OPTICS) asked the established partner (i.e. GCOMP) whether they 
were willing to acquire the remaining shares and to take the lead in moving towards 
large-scale manufacturing of the Optical Glass product: 
‘OPTICS had to change into a higher gear to address the emerging market 
opportunities. The CEO of OPTICS realized that he would not be able to 
achieve this acceleration in growth by itself, neither from a financial 
perspective nor from an organizational point of view. He therefore asked 
GCOMP to take over 100% of the OPTICS shares. (GCOMP manager)’  
 
In all cases, we also observed that, when a shift from collaboration to 
acquisition was realized, substantial additional integration efforts were made (see 
Table 4). Although integration already had taken off during the pre-acquisition 
collaboration, additional efforts in consolidating the technology platform and/or the 
operational production systems were conducted. In addition, while the entrepreneurial 
partner had maintained structural autonomy during the collaboration stage, structural 
integration of the entrepreneurial unit was initiated after the acquisition. In three cases 
(i.e. Coating Trajectory, Optical Glass Trajectory, Substrate Polishing Trajectory), 
structural absorption (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) was observed, meaning that the 
entrepreneurial unit was integrated in the existing structures of the established 
company. In the Optical Glass Trajectory, for instance, the acquired OPTICS unit 
became structurally embedded in the existing optics business division of GCOMP. In 
one case (i.e. Combustion Burner Trajectory), structural symbiosis (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991) was observed, meaning that the structures of the entrepreneurial and 
established partner were merged together to create a new structure. In this case, the 
acquired GBURN unit was merged together with MAT’s existing combustion burner 
division, triggering a new structure which was physically situated at the GBURN 
facilities. Interviewees referred to the changed power position of the established 
partner as the main explanation for these additional post-acquisition integration 
efforts. In particular, it was argued that, as the established partner now became the 
main shareholder, they wanted to get a ‘full grip on the operational activities at the 
acquired firm’ (GCOMP engineer). 
While the established firms initiated substantial additional integration efforts 
after the acquisition, they continued to apply a quite careful approach regarding their 
relationship with the original management of the entrepreneurial partner. In all cases, 
the established partner tried to minimize the amount of management changes at the 
acquired firm (see Table IV). In the interviews, two reasons were mentioned to 
explain this careful approach. First, it was stressed that the former CEO of the 
acquired firm possessed critical technological knowledge and critical customer 
relationships, which needed to be preserved as much as possible. The Optical Glass 
Trajectory provides an illustrative example in this respect. During the pre-acquisition 
collaboration stage, it had become clear that there was some strategic divergence 
between the OPTICS CEO and the GCOMP management was not really the same. 
While the GCOMP management wanted to focus all activities on commercializing the 
Optical Glass technology as fast as possible for large-scale applications, the CEO of 
OPTICS also wanted to look at the possibilities of the Optical Glass technology for 
blue-sky applications. After the acquisition, GCOMP therefore decided to appoint a 
new CEO at OPTICS who would be responsible for moving towards large-scale 
manufacturing. However, as the technological knowledge of the former CEO was 
perceived to be very important, they also decided to keep the former CEO within the 
company and to give him the title of CTO:  
‘We were dependent on his knowledge that was not codified… If he [=CEO of 
OPTICS] would leave the company, we would have bought an empty box.’ 
(GCOMP manager) 
        
A second reason to minimize management changes was to avoid instability at 
the operational level. In the Substrate Polishing Trajectory, for instance, the 
management team of the entrepreneurial partner (i.e. POLISH) turned out to be quite 
incompetent with respect to conducting large-scale manufacturing. After a while, 
GCOMP therefore decided to acquire POLISH and to make substantial additional 
investments in turning POLISH into a high-quality production unit. However, despite 
their proven incompetence, GCOMP decided to maintain the original management in 
order to give the operational people a feeling of stability: 
‘After the acquisition, we have left the management intact. We opted not to 
change the General Manager… We thought that we needed a transition stage 
to guarantee the survival of the group, to make sure that everything did not fall 
apart and give them a feeling of continuity.’ (GCOMP manager) 
 
 Need for management changes during post-acquisitions process.  While 
extensive additional integration efforts were planned in all observed cases, we also 
observed that, during the first year after the acquisition, the actual implementation of 
these integration efforts turned out to be difficult in most of the cases.  In the 
Substrate Polishing Trajectory, for instance, the purpose of the additional post-
acquisition integration efforts had been to further consolidate the production systems 
of GCOMP and POLISH in order to ‘speak as one team toward the customer’ 
(GCOMP manager). However, instead of reaching further consolidation, huge 
difficulties emerged with respect of the production activities of POLISH. Moreover, it 
turned out to be quite difficult for GCOMP to get a grip on these problems: 
‘Production of substrates reached a peak in 1997. At that moment, a number of 
critical events took place during which production was completely stopped at 
the SCOMP site and our customer refused to accept substrates. All at once, I 
was sent there to completely restart the production process. The problem was 
that, after I had returned to Belgium, the same problems emerged again. 
(GCOMP engineer)’ 
 
In the Combustion Burner trajectory and the Optical Glass trajectory, similar 
difficulties were observed. In the Combustion Burner trajectory, centralization of 
R&D activities and burner production activities at the facilities of GBURN triggered 
huge problems. In the Optical Glass trajectory, it turned out to be quite difficult to 
transform OPTICS into a production unit that was ready for large-scale 
manufacturing.  
Interviewees referred to the management of the entrepreneurial firm as the 
main reason to explain these difficulties in achieving successful post-acquisition 
integration:  
First we naively thought: ‘We let these people do it by themselves. We talk 
with them, we visit them. In this way, we will be able to motivate them to 
make their quality system more rigid and to provide their employees with the 
necessary training.’ This however did not work out…It was very difficult to 
convince them [= management team of POLISH] to do it differently.’ 
(GCOMP manager) 
‘The General Manager of GBURN tended to keep MAT at a distance, which 
made it difficult to integrate MAT’s burner activities in the GBRURN 
activities.’ (MAT manager) 
‘The former CEO of OPTICS had difficulties to renounce its former 
responsibilities. Tensions and conflicts between the old and new CEO 
consequently emerged. Rationally, he [= former CEO of OPTICS] knew that 
he no longer was the optimal guy to lead OPTICS, but emotionally he was not 
able to remain distant. In this way, a critical situation arose.’ (GCOMP 
manager). 
 
In each of the three cases, the original management of the entrepreneurial firm 
tended to disturb the additional integration efforts, triggering huge relational conflicts 
between the management of the acquired firm and the management of the acquiring 
firm. In the end, drastic management changes were made at the entrepreneurial unit in 
all three cases. In the Burner Combustion trajectory and the Optical Glass trajectory, 
the management team of the acquired firm was fired and replaced by a new 
management team. In the Substrate Polishing trajectory, one GCOMP manager was 
send to the POLISH unit to take charge of the integration activities. In all three cases, 
these drastic management changes quickly started paying off. We observed that swift 
progress was made in further consolidating the technology platforms and/or the 
operational production systems of the acquired and acquiring firm. In the Substrate 
Polishing trajectory, for instance, the GCOMP manager, who now was in charge of 
managing the POLISH unit, managed to implement a new quality system based on 
ISO-9002 principles and succeeded in streamlining the communication procedures 
within this entrepreneurial unit. 
It needs to be stressed that, in contrast to the established firm’s initial 
expectations, the execution of drastic management changes did not result in 
significant loss of technological knowledge or significant instability at the operational 
level. The Optical Glass Trajectory is an illustrative example in this respect. As 
already mentioned, GCOMP’s management had initially feared that removing the 
former CEO of OPTICS would lead to substantial loss of fundamental knowledge. 
However, after GCOMP had fired the former CEO of OPTICS, it became clear that 
the two engineers, who had always worked with the former CEO, had been able to 
absorb most of the fundamental knowledge. Moreover, these two engineers turned out 
to be very motivated to stay involved within GCOMP. The build-up of a solid 
relational foundation during the pre-acquisition collaboration stage was mentioned as 
an important aspect to explain the willingness of the OPTICS engineers to stay 
involved within GCOMP:  
‘On the managerial level, tensions have emerged after the acquisition... 
[However], we had an excellent relationship with him and this relationship 
only intensified after the acquisition. On our level, there were no differences 
of opinion. We wanted to become successful and GCOMP could support us in 
this objective.’ (OPTICS engineer) 
 
Finally, it needs to be emphasized that in the Coating Trajectory the post-
acquisition integration proceeded more smoothly. The presence of a convergent 
strategic vision between the management of FRCOAT and the management of MAT 
seems to explain this smooth implementation of additional integration efforts. In 
contrast to the three other cases, a clear common strategic vision had emerged in the 
Coating Trajectory during the pre-acquisition collaboration stage. According to the 
interviews, this common strategic vision facilitated the post-acquisition integration 
process: 
‘There is common, shared strategy. MAT acknowledges the advantages of 
FRCOAT and FRCOAT sees the advantages of MAT. They speak the same 
knowledge. There is no discussion about what we will do in 2 or 3 years… [In 
this way], the FRCOAT people could be integrated in MAT.’ (MAT manager) 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Previous studies (e.g. Folta, 1998; Folta & Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991; McGrath, 
1997) have pointed to the increased occurrence of transitional governance in external 
technology sourcing trajectories, where partners gradually shift from collaborative to 
more integrative approaches. In addition, these studies have identified a number of 
factors that influence when partners shift from collaboration to acquisition. However, 
much less is known about how this transition is made. Based on our findings, we 
present in this section a number of propositions that connect the pre-acquisition 
collaboration and the post-acquisition integration stages. Subsequently, we point to 
the main managerial implications of our study. Finally, we discuss the main limitation 
of our study and point to interesting avenues for future research. 
Connecting Pre-Acquisition Collaboration and Post-Acquisition Integration 
Real option scholars already provided evidence that greater technological uncertainty 
(i.e. uncertainty about the feasibility of the entrepreneurial partner’s technology) 
increases the likelihood of transitional governance, where acquisition is preceded by a 
collaboration stage. In this way, the established partner can use the collaboration stage 
to evaluate the technology of the entrepreneurial partner. While we acknowledge the 
relevance of technological uncertainty as a factor that influences the choice for 
transitional governance, we also identify relational uncertainty as a second factor in 
this respect. In particular, we observed that, in some cases, the entrepreneurial partner 
preferred to first engage in a collaboration stage in order to evaluate the good 
intentions of the established partner. We therefore propose that:    
Proposition 1: Greater relational uncertainty at the entrepreneurial partner (i.e. 
uncertainty about the good intentions of the established partner) increases the 
probability of the implementation of a collaboration stage before the 
acquisition. 
 
 While the acquisition literature has mainly focused on integration during the 
post-acquisition phase, we observed that firms can already engage in integration 
efforts during the pre-acquisition collaboration stage. In particular, we observed that, 
during the pre-acquisition collaboration stage, efforts were made to consolidate the 
technological platform and/or the operational production system of the involved 
companies. At the same time, it needs to be stressed that, during the pre-acquisition 
collaboration stage, the involved companies maintained structural autonomy and that 
the pre-acquisition integration efforts were introduced in a very careful manner. We 
also found first indications that the presence of these pre-acquisition integration 
efforts influenced the post-acquisition integration process. In particular, our data 
suggest that the presence of pre-acquisition integration efforts might facilitate 
preserving fundamental knowledge during the post-acquisition integration stage. We 
observed that the initiation of these pre-acquisition integration efforts contributed to 
the emergence of a solid relational foundation on the operational level, which in-turn 
motivated key-technologists of the acquired firm to stay present after the acquisition, 
even when drastic management changes were made. We therefore propose that:  
Proposition 2: The presence of pre-acquisition integration efforts increases the 
ability to preserve critical knowledge during the post-acquisition integration 
stage. 
 
 Our findings also indicate that, when partners shift from a collaboration to an 
acquisition mode, substantial additional integration efforts are made. In all observed 
cases, the acquired firm was structurally integrated in the acquiring firm. In addition, 
additional efforts were made to further consolidate technology platforms and 
operational productions systems. At the same time, though, management changes at 
the acquired firm remained limited in order to avoid loss of knowledge and instability. 
In three of the observed cases, post-acquisition integration turned out to be difficult, 
resulting in relational conflict between the management of that acquired and acquiring 
firm. In these cases, integration only became successful after substantial management 
changes were made at the acquired firm. In the fourth case, however, post-acquisition 
integration proceeded much more smoothly. The extent of strategic convergence, 
realized during the pre-acquisition collaboration stage, seems to explain these 
observed differences. In the first three cases, strategic convergence had been limited. 
In these cases, a common strategic objective had not yet emerged. In the fourth case, 
however, strategic convergence was observed during the pre-acquisition collaboration 
stage. In this case, the collaboration firm had come to a common strategic objective 
(i.e. developing a joint technology platform in order to get access to the automotive 
industry). Our data indicate that such strategic convergence hugely facilitated the 
post-acquisition integration process. We therefore propose that:     
Proposition 3: The lower (higher) the strategic convergence between 
entrepreneurial and established firm during the pre-acquisition collaboration 
stage, the higher the need for substantial (limited) management changes at the 
acquired firm during the post-acquisition integration process. 
 
Managerial Implications 
Previous acquisition scholars have emphasized the relevance of implementing a 
gradual post-acquisition integration trajectory in order to address the tension between 
the need to preserve knowledge within the acquired firm and the need to realize 
synergies between the acquired and acquiring firm (see Figure 1). In particular, they 
suggest that, during the first years after the acquisition, focus should be on human 
integration or creation of positive attitudes towards the integration among employees 
on both sides’ (Birkinshaw et al., 2000: 400). During this first stage, task integration 
or ‘the identification and realization of operational synergies’ (Birkinshaw et al., 
2000: 400) should remain limited to initiating efforts to achieve acceptable 
performance in the individual operating units. When human integration is achieved 
and the performance of the individual operating units has reached an acceptable level, 
the second stage of the post-acquisition integration trajectory can be initiated. At this 
stage, more substantial task integration efforts are initiated in order to allow for 
achieving operational synergies across the individual operating units. The shared 
identity and mutual respect that have emerged during the first stage, provide the 
relational foundation for such closer task integration. 
 Based on examining four external technology sourcing trajectories, in which 
the acquisition of entrepreneurial companies was preceded by a collaboration stage, 
we suggest an alternative integration trajectory (see Figure 1). While the integration 
trajectory of Birkinshaw et al. (2000) only starts after the actual acquisition, our 
alternative integration trajectory is already initiated during the pre-acquisition 
collaboration stage. In particular, we argue that, during the pre-acquisition 
collaboration stage, the entrepreneurial partner can carefully initiate some task 
integration efforts to create a joint technological platform and to improve the 
operational production system of the entrepreneurial partner. These carefully 
introduced integration efforts will not only contribute to acceptable performance at 
the entrepreneurial partner, but also facilitates human integration (i.e. emergence of 
solid relational foundation at the operational level). In this way, the established firm 
can immediately shift to more substantial task integration after the acquisition of the 
entrepreneurial partner. Again, we want to emphasize that, during this second stage of 
this integration trajectory, the original management of the acquired firm can only 
remain intact when strategic convergence between acquired and acquiring firm has 
been established. 
Limitations and Future Research 
As a final reflection, we point to the main limitations of this study. First, our findings 
are based on an in-depth examination of a limited number of external technology 
sourcing trajectories in the advanced materials industry. Although this research design 
allowed us to compare the four trajectories relationships with a minimum influence of 
extraneous variation, its findings are contextualized. Particular characteristics of the 
technological trajectory or the involved companies themselves may have influenced 
our findings. We acknowledge that the development of a more general theory on the 
linkages between pre-acquisition collaboration and post-acquisition integration 
requires additional case studies in other contexts. 
A second limitation is related to our retrospective data-collection strategy. 
Despite our efforts to maximize the reliability of our data (i.e. multiple data collection 
techniques, feedback interviews with informants), our data-collection strategy 
restricted the ability to obtain a micro-level understanding of some essential processes 
and/or events. We therefore point to real-time research as a viable option to further 
elaborate on the findings that emerged from our study. 
 Despite these limitations, this study has managed to provide first insights in 
how pre-acquisition collaboration and post-acquisition integration are connected to 
each other in external technology sourcing trajectories. We hope that our findings 
may stimulate scholars to further examine the phenomenon of transitional governance 
in a wide variety of organizational settings. At the same time, we hope that our 
insights might help practitioners in further optimizing their technology sourcing and 
acquisition strategies. 
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TABLE I: Overview of Cases 
 
External 
Technology 
Sourcing Trajectory 
Involved Companies Pre-acquisition relationship Technology 
Acquisition 
Coating 
 Trajectory 
MAT: international company active in the 
domains of metal transformation and 
advanced materials 
FRCOAT: high tech SME, specialized in 
the development of advanced coatings 
2001 – 2003:  
Equity relationship 
June 2003: 
FRCOAT acquired 
by MAT   
Combustion Burner 
Trajectory 
MAT: international company active in the 
domains of metal transformation and 
advanced materials 
GBURN: high-tech SME, specialized in 
development and production of gas burners 
1999-2001:  
Equity relationship  
February 2001: 
GBURN acquired 
by MAT 
Optical Glass 
Trajectory 
GCOMP: international company active in 
the domains of materials and metals 
OPTICS : high-tech SME specialized in 
development of optical lenses 
1998 – 2001:  
Equity relationship  
July 2001:  
OPTICS acquired by 
GCOMP 
Substrate Polishing  
Trajectory 
GCOMP: international company active in 
the domains of materials and metals 
POLISH: high-tech SME specialized in 
processing Silicon substrates 
1994 – 1995: 
Technology transfer 
agreement 
1995 – 1996: 
Collaborative production 
agreement 
September 1996:  
POLISH acquired 
by GCOMP 
TABLE II: Overview of interviews and documents 
External 
Technology 
Sourcing Trajectory 
Number of interviews Private documents 
Coating Trajectory MAT: 8 interviews 
FRCOAT: 2 interviews 
Contracts 
Minutes of board meetings 
Slides of board meeting 
presentations 
Minutes of technological meetings 
Combustion Burner 
Trajectory 
MAT: 5 interviews 
GBURN: 2 interviews 
Contracts 
Minutes of board meetings 
Slides of board meeting 
presentations 
Optical Glass 
Trajectory 
GCOMP: 7 interviews 
OPTICS: 2 interviews 
Contracts 
Minutes of board meetings 
Substrate Polishing 
Trajectory 
GCOMP: 3 interviews 
SCOMP: 3 interviews 
Contracts 
Minutes of board meetings 
Fax correspondance 
TABLE III: Overview of pre-acquisition integration efforts 
 
Pre-Acquisition Integration 
Efforts 
Coating Trajectory 
(MAT and FRCOAT) 
Combustion Burner Trajectory 
(MAT and GBURN) 
Optical Glass Trajectory 
(GCOMP and OPTICS) 
Substrate Polishing Trajectory 
(GCOMP and POLISH) 
Integration efforts to 
consolidate technology 
platforms 
Transfer of FRCOAT’s 
coating equipment to MAT 
Transfer of MAT’s coating 
equipment to FRCOAT 
Joint training sessions for 
MAT and FRCOAT engineers 
Regular visits of GBURN 
project manager at MAT 
facilities 
 Transfer of POLISH’s silicon 
substrate polishing capabilities 
to GCOMP 
Transfer of GCOMP’s 
anonium substrate polishing 
capabilities to POLISH 
Integration efforts to 
consolidate operational 
production systems 
  Regular visits of GCOMP 
project manager at OPTICS 
facilities 
Building of new OPTICS 
production facility, financially 
supported by GCOMP   
Regular visits of GCOMP 
project manager at POLISH 
facilities 
Moving to new POLISH 
production facility, financially 
supported by GCOMP 
 
TABLE IV: Overview of post-acquisition integration efforts and management changes 
 Coating Trajectory 
(MAT and FRCOAT) 
Combustion Burner Trajectory 
(MAT and GBURN) 
Optical Glass Trajectory 
(GCOMP and OPTICS) 
Substrate Polishing Trajectory 
(GCOMP and POLISH) 
Post-acquisition integration 
efforts 
    
Structural integration efforts Structural absorption of 
FRCOAT in the  MAT’s 
Diamond Group 
 
Structural symbiosis of GBURN 
and MAT’s combustion burner 
division 
 
Structural absorption of 
OPTICS in the Optics 
business division of 
GCOMP 
Structural absorption of 
POLISH in the Amonium 
business division of GCOMP 
Integration efforts to 
consolidate technological 
platform 
Development of a technology 
matrix to stimulate exchange 
of technology between 
different members of the MAT 
Diamond Group 
Joint R&D team to develop 
new coating technology for 
automotive application 
Centralization of R&D activities at 
GBURN facilities 
 
Codification of OPTICS’ 
Optical Glass technology 
and production process 
by GCOMP engineer 
Joint exploration of new 
application domains for 
POLISH’s silicon polishing 
capabilities 
Integration efforts to 
consolidate operational 
production systems 
Introduction of MAT’s 
operational standards and 
systems at FRCOAT 
Introduction of MAT’s operational 
standards and systems at GBURN 
Centralization of burner production 
activities at GBURN facilities 
Introduction of 
GCOMP’s project 
management systems 
 
Introduction of GCOMP’s 
project management systems 
Post-acquisition management 
changes 
No management changes 
(Former FRCOAT CEO 
continues managing FRCOAT 
unit) 
Former GBURN CEO leaves the 
company but appoints himself a 
successor to manage GBURN unit 
Former OPTICS CEO 
becomes CTO of 
OPTICS unit. GCOMP 
appoints new CEO for 
OPTICS unit 
No management changes 
(Former POLISH CEO 
continues managing POLISH 
unit) 
 
FIGURE 1: Traditional and alternative integration trajectory 
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